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1. Introduction: language and protolanguage 
The phylogenetic development of language is a complex topic, an appropriate 
treatment of which crucially depends on a proper handling of this central notion 
— l a n g u a g e  — i.e. in a way that would be most theoretically fruitful. A con-
venient starting point is provided by the classification developed by S. Lamb (re-
viewed in Johansson 2005: 5-6), who, basing on earlier terminology, distin-
guishes: 
1. language1, roughly equivalent to the Saussurian l a  p a r o l e  ; 
2. language2, roughly equivalent to the Saussurian l a  l a n g u e ; 
3. language3; roughly equivalent to the Chomskyan I - l a n g u a g e ; 
4. language4; innate, genetically determined, species-specific ability to ac-
quire language. 
Based on the above classification, two senses of language are viable targets 
for phylogenetic/evolutionary explanations — language2 and language4 — giving 
rise to two major complementary perspectives. Following J. Hurford (1999), we 
term these perspectives the e v o l u t i o n  o f  l a n g u a g e s  and the e v o l u -
t i o n  o f  l a n g u a g e . The former, concerned with the development of lan-
guage as externalized code spanning tens or hundreds of thousands of years (thus 
different from historical grammar), utilizes partly linguistic methodology aided 
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greatly by computational tools. The latter, the ‘proper’ evolution of language, 
takes interest in the biological emergence of the human language faculty, deals 
with a larger time scale measured in millions of years, and is highly interdiscipli-
nary. It is also the perspective assumed in the rest of this paper. 
 As has been suggested by numerous scholars (e.g. Bickerton 2007; Hur-
ford 2003), the complex and multifaceted nature of language dictates that its evo-
lutionary emergence is not a uniform issue that may be reflected in a single un-
wieldy research question, but rather needs to be broken down into a collection of 
smaller-scale sub-tasks. Minimally, there are two such distinct questions: the 
emergence of language out of pre-language, and the emergence of pre-language. 
This, of course, entails a meaningful and well-grounded definition of a pre-
language that is qualitatively different from both the communication of nonhuman 
animals and from language in modern human populations. This need was catered 
for by D. Bickerton, who established the notion of p r o t o l a n g u a g e , distinct 
from the notion of proto-language as understood in historical grammar (e.g. Bick-
erton 1998). Protolanguage is used in the evolution of language research to mean 
the early stage of language-like communication, characterised by the absence of 
grammatical structure, especially of thematic relations and combinatorial, hierar-
chical syntax, but the presence of the conventional sign as well as informative, 
c o o p e r a t i v e  s i g n a l l i n g  (see below). Our paper pertains to the stage of 
the emergence of protolanguage so construed. 
2. Communication 
Classic in linguistics is R. Jakobson’s model of communication, which focuses on 
the elements involved in a communicative act: 
The ADDRESSER sends a MESSAGE to the ADDRESSEE. To  be operative the mes-
sage requires a CONTEXT referred to, sizeable by the addressee, and either verbal or ca-
pable of being verbalised; a CODE fully, or at least partially, common to the addresser 
and addressee (or in other words, to the encoder and decoder of the message); and finally, 
a CONTACT,  a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser 
and addressee, enabling both of them to enter  and stay in communication. (Jakobson 
[1960] 1999: 47) 
Jakobson’s primary motivation in spelling out the model is to delimit the 
functions of language — elaborating on K. Bühler’s model of language (1934), he 
anchors the functions of language in the structure of a communicative act. Thus, 
the referential function is orientated towards the context in which an act takes 
place; the emotive function, towards the addresser; the conative, towards the ad-
dressee; the phatic function is focused on the contact between the addresser and 
addressee; the metalinguistic one reflexively bears on the communicative code; 
and the poetic function, as already explained, is message-orientated (Jakobson 
([1960] 1999: 48-51). The structure-function model has been widely accepted in 
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linguistics, exerting a particularly strong influence on functional approaches to 
language analysis such as J. R. Firth’s functionalism or M. A. K. Halliday’s sys-
temic grammar (see Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 41-42).  
Mutatis mutandis, the same conception of communication underlies C. Shan-
non and W. Weaver’s foundational work of on information theory (1949). Their 
study into statistical probabilities of verbal responses highlights the components 
of a communication system: source, transmitter, signal, receiver, message, desti-
nation, and noise. The difference between Jakobson’s view of communication, on 
the one hand, and Shannon and Weaver’s, on the other, results from their respec-
tive research goals — if Jakobson, to present an exhaustive description of linguis-
tic functions, needs a holistic account of a communicative act, Shannon and 
Weaver’s cybernetic approach selectively focuses on the possibilities of formali-
sation of information transfer. In linguistics and related disciplines, the general-
ised model based on those two proposals is referred to as the c o d e  m o d e l  
(alternatively, the t r a n s m i s s i o n  m o d e l ), in which communication is 
conceptualised as transfer of information that is encoded in signals produced by 
the sender, transmitted through a channel and decoded by the receiver; the under-
lying metaphor is that of conduit (Reddy 1979). 
The chief alternative model of communication stems from H. P. Grice’s 
pragmatics, and in particular from his work on conversational implicature. Grice 
views communication as a collaborative process — since, as he claims, much of 
talk is implicit, speakers must rely on inference to reconstruct intended meanings 
of each others’ utterances (Grice [1975] 1999, see also Jaworski and Coupland 
1999: 43). Being a rationalist, Grice believes that conversational inference is gov-
erned by a set of rules, and his model of communication based on the Cooperative 
Principle (CP) should be seen as an attempt explicate them:  
I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely 
as something that we all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REA-
SONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. ... So I would like to able 
to show that observance of the CP and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the follow-
ing lines: that anyone who cares about goals that are central to conversa-
tion/communication (e.g. giving and receiving information, influencing and being influ-
enced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in 
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are 
conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims. (Grice [1975] 1999: 70) 
Grice’s interactive-inferential  model  of communication has been a last-
ing influence in pragmatics. For example, its direct continuation is D. Sperber and 
D. Wilson’s relevance theory, which emphasises the role of the Relevance Maxim 
in the construction of discourse (1986). Furthermore, his ideas played an im-
portant part in the inception politeness research. In “Logic and Conversation”, 
Grice (1975) offers a brief comment that along the Cooperative Principle, which 
is geared towards informational clarity, conversational exchanges are regulated by 
the Politeness Principle, whose function is to make interaction socially appropri-
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ate. This led some linguists, most notably R. Lakoff and G. Leech, to try to elabo-
rate on the notion of the Politeness Principle, which — in turn — created a con-
text for the foundation of politeness study as an independent theoretical pursuit 
within pragmatics (see Eelen 2001, Watts 2003, and Żywiczyński 2010).  
While both the code model and the interactive-inferential model are geared 
to dealing with communication in humans, extending our task to the description 
of communication in prelinguistic hominids places additional — and partly unex-
pected — requirements which make those two models insufficient. Both the 
above approaches presume the existence of an essentially cooperative frame of 
interaction which, while characteristic of language as it is today, is an assumption 
that cannot be legitimately made with respect to the nascent stages of language-
like communication. To remove this fundamental limitation, a third model of 
communication must be introduced, embracing a wider scale of biological phe-
nomena; it may be named the ‘naturalistic model’ or, after J. Krebs and R. Daw-
kins (1984), the ‘cynical’ model. On this model, communication is seen as inter-
play between the actor and the reactor, both of whom are trying to maximise their 
respective payoffs as described by game theory. Communication is “the process 
in which actors use specifically designed signals or displays to modify the behav-
ior of reactors” (Krebs and Davies 1993), and it occurs “when the action of or cue 
given by one organism is perceived by and thus alters the probability pattern of 
behaviour in another organism in a fashion adaptive to either one or both of the 
participants” (Wilson 1975). More ‘cynically’, “[a] signal is a means by which 
one animal (the ‘actor’) exploits another animal’s (the ‘reactor’s’) muscle power” 
(Krebs and Dawkins 1984: 380-381). 
2.1. Communication and evolutionary stability 
In discussing conditions on communication being an evolutionarily stable strate-
gy, a short review of the logic of evolution’s basic mechanism, natural selection, 
will be useful. As a first step, mutation is responsible for introducing variety in a 
population’s gene pool, which translates into variety in the phenotypes present in 
that population (with behavioural strategies/tendencies included under the notion 
of ‘phenotype’ and thus given at least some genetic anchoring). As a next step, 
selection weeds out those phenotypes that are below average at passing on the 
genes that built them. As a logical conclusion, evolutionary theory stipulates that 
only those behavioural strategies will survive and reach evolutionary stability that 
are the most profitable ones in terms of their genetic success, i.e. that are charac-
terised by the best benefit/cost trade-off calculated in terms of the genetic success 
of the phenotype implementing a given strategy. Individuals that follow a sub-
standard strategy have reproductive success below the population average, which 
means that natural selection acts to gradually eliminate their genes from the gene 
pool of the population; this in turn means the gradual elimination of the strategy 
itself from the population’s behavioural repertoire. In contrast, a successful strat-
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egy is by definition such a strategy that grants those who adopt it a greater genetic 
success, leading to its gradual expansion in the population. A strategy that — 
once adopted by the majority of individuals in the population — is impossible to 
be replaced by a different strategy, goes by the name of e v o l u t i o n a r i l y  
s t a b l e  s t r a t e g y  (ESS) (see also Wacewicz and Żywiczyński 2008). 
2.2. Cooperative communication is not an ESS. 
Altruism (acting to the benefit of another organism at a cost to oneself) and coop-
eration (reciprocating help; that is reciprocating, at a later time, altruistic behav-
iour directed towards oneself) are phenomena that are extremely rare in nature. 
This uncommonness is well attested by empirical data from ethology and equally 
well grounded in evolutionary theory (e.g. West et al., in press), which explains it 
by reference to the notion of ESS: simply put, altruistic and cooperative behav-
iours tend not to be evolutionarily stable. A crucial step in our reasoning is to 
realise that honest communication is a form of cooperation and thus displays the 
same vulnerability to being outcompeted by alternative strategies. 
All volitional communication starts with the production of a signal, which 
carries some cost — at a minimum, it is more expensive than its alternative, doing 
nothing. Even if the cost is very small, given sufficient time natural selection will 
act to eliminate this behavioural strategy — unless the cost of producing the sig-
nal is outweighed by the benefits consequent on its production. In principle, such 
benefits could take the form of reciprocation from the other party, as is so often 
the case in human language: if the signaller imparts valuable information to the 
receiver, he or she may expect the receiver to return this favour at a later time. 
Still, ceteris paribus, a strategy to reciprocate for honest signalling will always be 
outcompeted by a cheater (free-riding) strategy “reap the benefits of honest com-
munication, but do not pay the costs (however small) of reciprocating”. 
However, the strategy of producing honest signals faces a more serious and 
more fundamental risk from a different direction. A strategy “use dishonest rather 
than honest messages to manipulate the receiver to behave to the signaller’s ad-
vantage” clearly offers greater fitness benefits, and consequently it will spread in 
the population at the cost of the honest strategy. At a point when dishonest signal-
lers form a substantial proportion of a population, they exert a selection pressure 
on the receivers. The receivers who fall for dishonest signals enjoy a below-
average reproductive success, leading to the progressive elimination of their genes 
and with them — the behavioural strategy of observing signals. 
2.3. Linguistic communication as cooperation 
In stark contrast to the implications of the reasoning presented above, language 
(as we know it today) presents itself as a communication system that is inherently 
and pervasively cooperative. Reviewing the full spectrum of cooperative phe-
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nomena in language would constitute an immense task that could not be attempt-
ed in this short section. However, at this point we would like to highlight at least 
some aspects of language that lay bare its unquestionably cooperative design. 
Even a perfunctory look at semantic and pragmatic aspects of language or-
ganisation indicates that linguistic communication is geared towards facilitating 
the correct interpretation of valuable signals. In very basic terms, the primary 
function of language is to reliably and voluntarily transmit symbolic information 
by phonological means, that is, by discrete vocal units (see e.g. Jackendoff 2002, 
Donald 1991, Deacon 1997, MacNeilage 2008).  As argued by Studdert-Kennedy 
and Lane (summarised in MacNeilage 2007: 96-98), the development of phonolo-
gy resulted from the pressure towards increasing the expressive power of vocal 
communication — the essential condition in the emergence of language was to 
enrich symbolic contents that could be communicated without compromising 
perceptual distinctiveness of vocal signals. This pressure set in operation the pro-
cess of self-diversification governed by the particulate principle, which eventually 
resulted in the appearance of dual patterning (Studdert-Kennedy 1998, Hockett 
1960). This characteristically linguistic phenomenon depends on a finite and low-
er-order set of discrete sound units (i.e. phonemes) to form higher-order elements 
— monomorphemic or multimorphemic lexemes (MacNeilage 2008: 97). Here, 
the logic of the development is to promote the value of transmitted signals by 
increasing their semantic richness, and at the same time, to make these signals 
easily interpretable by strengthening their perceptual distinctiveness. 
The special status of linguistic communication is also visible at the pragmatic 
level, which is here understood broadly as aspects of context and discourse organ-
isation used by receivers to interpret verbal messages (Saeed 1997: 9). For exam-
ple, there seem to be a discursive norm which stipulates that text-receivers should 
benefit from acts of communication by being supplied with new information but 
only such new information that they will able to interpret. R. De Beaugrande and 
W. Dressler use the notion of r e g u l a t i v e  i n t e g r a t i o n  to explicate how 
this norm operates: 
[A] text constitutes a cybernetic system which continually regulates the functions of its 
constituent occurrences. Whenever a textual occurrence falls outside the participants’ 
systems of knowledge about language, content, and purpose, the stability of the textual 
system is disturbed and must be restored by regulative integration of that occurrence, e.g. 
via additions or modifications to one’s store of knowledge. (de Beaugrande and Dressler 
1981: 36) 
 Accordingly, they distinguish three levels of text informativity: the f i r s t -
o r d e r  of default knowledge; the s e c o n d - o r d e r , where informativity is 
beyond the default level but can still be integrated into participants’ discourse 
models; and the t h i r d - o r d e r  of novel and/or unexpected information which 
radically falls outside participants’ discourse models and cannot therefore be inte-
grated into them (de Beaugrande and Dressler 1981: 142-144). The second level 
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represents the desired state of discourse, in which informativity is partly depend-
ent of the two types context — the intraliguistic context, related to what has been 
said (backward directionality) or will be said (forward directionality) and the ex-
tralinguistic linguistic context (outward directionality), related to elements of the 
communicative occurrence (such as previous texts, situation, coherence relations, 
etc.). The appearance of either first-order or their-order entities instigates the pro-
cess of regulative integration, whose function is to bring discourse to the second 
level of informativity. This is done by upgrading the informativity of first-order 
entities and downgrading the informativity of third-order entities:  
The presence of at least some second-order occurrences would be the normal standard for 
textual communication, since texts purely on the first order would be difficult to con-
struct and extremely uninteresting. Upon occasion, first-order occurrences could be UP-
GRADED and third-order ones DOWNGRADED to keep the medium order... (de Beau-
grande and Dressler 1981: 143-144)  
Another interesting aspect of linguistic communication pertains to the organi-
sation of postural and proxemic environment in which it takes place. As micro-
studies suggest, conversation — the most prototypical form of language use (see 
e.g. Dunbar 1996) — requires that interactants should be positioned face-to-face 
in close proximity. A typical conversational exchange involves the vis-à-vis 
presentation (Scheflen 1972: 239ff) and personal distance, the term originally 
used by Hediger to indicate space separating members of non-contact species 
(1955) and adopted by Hall with reference to the distance in which people hold 
most of informal meetings (1969:119-120). The exact delimitation of personal 
distance differs from culture to culture, but it possesses a set of universal charac-
teristics; for example, it is long enough to prevent visual distortion, which occurs 
in intimate distance; foveal vision covers face, torso, and arms; head size is per-
ceived as normal and details of facial expression are clearly visible; speech is 
characterised by conversational style, moderate level of voice, and neutral tempo 
of delivery (Hall 1969: 119ff). Taking it all together, such a micro-ecological 
make-up provides an interpersonal encounter with what Goffman calls f o c u s  
— a sense of togetherness which enables people to openly cooperate by taking 
turns at talking (1963: 24). Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
micro-ecological make-up of conversational settings serves to guarantee reliable 
transfer of semantic information from the sender to the receiver.   
3. Conclusions: pre-existing cooperation as a prerequisite for language and 
the reception-driven nature of prelinguistic communication 
Sections 2.1 — 2.3 leave us with a paradox: the obviously cooperative nature 
of language makes it a strategy that should not be evolutionarily stable, at least 
under the default circumstances. There exist three major special factors responsi-
ble for those rare cases in which cooperation does emerge in nature: inherently 
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high signal cost, kin selection, and reputational mechanisms. Neither of the above 
applies to language, since linguistic signals cost almost nothing to produce, they 
are directed mostly to non-kin, and they themselves form a basis for reputational 
mechanisms (which means that invoking reputational mechanisms to explain the 
emergence of cooperation in language would be circular reasoning). Communica-
tive cooperation in humans, on the other hand, is compatible with generally high 
level of naturally occurring cooperation in our species. This in turn appears to be 
a unique trait whose evolutionary origins have so far failed to be addressed in a 
satisfying way (e.g. Henrich and Henrich 2007). 
CONCLUSION 1: the emergence of language requires a high degree of pre-existing non-
communicative cooperation between hominids (i.e. a generalised predisposition to cooperation as a 
species-wide cognitive trait manifested in as well as outside communicative contexts); while the 
emergence of protolanguage requires that cooperation, if not already present, at least co-develops 
with it in a process of coevolution based on positive mutual feedback. 
Nevertheless, it is important to realise that in early hominid phylogeny, at the 
nascent stages of languagelike communication, the default constraints from evolu-
tionary stability (as described in sections 2.1 and 2.2) must have applied with full 
force. This means that prior to the emergence of protolanguage, hominid commu-
nication would have been vulnerable to the standard risk of invasion from dishon-
est signallers, ultimately leading to collapse of communication. Given this risk, 
intentional signalling is an unlikely possibility for the origin of signals, which 
must instead have been based on the process of r i t u a l i s a t i o n  (see Krebs 
and Dawkins 1984). In ritualisation, it is the receiver who interprets (the begin-
ning of) an originally instrumental action as containing additional, reliable infor-
mation about the actor. In other words, for something to become a signal, it must 
be interpreted as one rather than produced as one. 
This becomes more obvious when one appreciates the inherent asymmetry 
between the roles of the sender and the receiver, in the light of the constraint of 
evolutionary stability discussed above. Normally, signallers are selected against 
revealing honest information to individuals not closely related to them. In receiv-
ers, however, natural selection acts to favour the ability to maximise the amount 
of information gleaned from the signals of others. The pattern described above is 
what is indeed found in nonhuman primates, whose communication is described 
as r e c e p t i o n - d r i v e n : the receivers “acquire information from signalers 
who do not, in the human sense, intend to provide it” (Seyfarth and Cheney 2003: 
168). This clearly points to the chronological primacy of reception over produc-
tion. Systematic signal production becomes possible only when, firstly, the ability 
for reception is already in place and secondly, stabilising factors for honesty (such 
as in-group cooperation) are present. 
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CONCLUSION 2: the constraints of evolutionary stability in communication systems dictate that — 
prior to the emergence of the generalised cooperative capacity discussed above — intentional sig-
nalling is inherently unstable, and the development of communication remains entirely reception-
driven. 
Finally, based on the above consideration, it would be interesting to address 
the question of the primacy of pragmatics or semantics from the phylogenetic 
point of view. Of course, a major difficulty lies in conceptualising those two lin-
guistic notions in a way that fits the context of a nonlinguistic communicative 
system. One useful canonical way of making the semantics/pragmatics distinction 
is based on meaning i n h e r e n t  in a given expression as opposed to meaning 
arising from the i n t e r a c t i o n  of the expression and the broadly defined con-
text (e.g. Trask 1999: 161-162). Following the reception-driven character of 
communication, it can be assumed that for a behavioural unit to be ritualised into 
a signal with an i n h e r e n t  meaning, it must first be systematically interpreted 
by the receivers trying to extract maximum information from it in a process heavi-
ly dependent on contextual cues. We suggest that this could be construed in terms 
of the application of a proto-pragmatic capacity, which — by this reasoning — 
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THE COOPERATIVE NATURE OF LANGUAGE FROM THE PHYLOGENETIC POINT OF 
VIEW 
This paper discusses the cooperative nature of language in the context of its emergence in hominid 
phylogeny. After a brief review of the main models of communication and an exposition of evolu-
tionary logic concerning the stability of communication systems, selected aspects of pragmatics and 
semantics are discussed that testify to the cooperative design of language. We conclude that firstly, 
robust pre-existing non-communicative cooperation must have been a prerequisite for the develop-
ment of language in hominids, and secondly, that the original hominid communicative system pre-
ceding language must have resembled the communication systems of extant nonhuman primates in 
being reception-driven. 
